Abstract: A long tradition of studies in political science has unveiled the effects of electoral institutions on party systems and parliamentary representation. Yet, their effects on campaign activities remain overlooked. Research in this tradition still lacks a strong comparative element able to explore the nuanced role that electoral institutions play in shaping individual-level campaigns during first-order parliamentary elections. We use data from a variety of national candidate studies to address this lacuna, showing that the electoral mobilisation efforts put in place by candidates are affected by the structure of the electoral institutions. Candidatecentred electoral systems propel higher mobilisation efforts, in terms of both campaign intensity and complexity. Moreover, we find that candidate-centred electoral systems shift the campaign focus towards individuals more than parties. By directly addressing the effects of electoral institutions on campaign behaviour, our study contributes to the wider debate on their role in promoting political engagement and mobilisation. The implications of our results concern the effects of electoral institutions on political competition, indicating that the extent to which electoral institutions impact upon it go well beyond what has been shown to date.
Introduction
Electoral institutions matter for a multiplicity of features of political life. The literature on electoral systems -specifically on their systemic effects -has extensively explored the consequences of electoral mechanisms on proportionality, the number of existing parties, the representation of minorities and women, etc. 2 Moreover, electoral institutions have been shown to shape the behaviour of voters, with regard to their likelihood of turning out to vote as well as vote choice. 3 Finally, a significant body of research suggests that the behaviour of elected representatives is also affected by electoral mechanisms. 4 Equally, the behaviour of parliamentary candidates should be shaped by the same institutions. In this article, we extend our understanding of electoral institutions and how they structure political competition by exploring their effect on the campaign activities of parliamentary candidates in the run up to first-order parliamentary elections. We do so by relying on a unique, pooled dataset of candidate studies from countries that employ a diverse range of electoral mechanisms.
To date, most studies of electoral campaigns during first-order parliamentary elections have been based on single systems, lacking an understanding of the role that electoral institutions play in the process. At the same time, contributions about the effects of electoral systems are concerned with their systemic effects much more than with their potential impact on the behaviour of political elites. In this study, we bridge these two traditions in order to enhance our understanding of elite behaviour, which fundamentally impacts on the extent to which citizens are exposed to campaign stimuli. Therefore, while directly addressing the scholarly literature on campaign behaviour, our study also contributes to the wider debate on the role of electoral institutions in promoting political engagement and mobilisation.
The novel data brought about by an extensive cross-sectional collection of candidate studies -we combine data from the Comparative Candidates Study (CCS) with compatible survey data from other countries -enable us to better grasp the multifaceted phenomena of political campaign. In particular, we disentangle the extent to which candidates' individual-level campaign effort varies under different electoral set ups. We do so by looking at the overall campaign effort put in place by candidates in the run up to first-order parliamentary elections, focusing on both its intensity as well as complexity. We find that under candidate-centred electoral institutions -for example, single member district plurality (SMD) , open list proportional representation (PR), and single transferable vote PR (PR-STV) -candidates' campaign effort tends to be more intense and complex than under partycentred mechanisms such as closed list PR. This -while intrinsically intuitive -goes against what has been found to be the case to date, 5 and indicates that the impact of electoral institutions is more far-reaching than what the state of the art describes.
Next to that, we shed further light on the relationship between individual candidates and their party by assessing how electoral institutions influence the candidates' campaign focus. Not surprisingly, the extent to which the candidates' campaign messages focus on themselves versus their party is also dependent on the structure of the electoral incentives, ceteris paribus. In addition, we find that candidates 4 campaign harder when the district magnitude is smaller. 6 All in all, the amount and type of campaign stimuli that voters are likely to experience is closely related to the electoral institutions.
The article is organised as follows. In the next section, we survey the literature that we touch upon to guide our investigation. We then outline our expectations, describe the data and the operationalisation of the variables in use. This is followed by a presentation and discussion of the results of our empirical analysis. We conclude by summarising our findings and evaluating their implications.
Electoral Institutions and Electoral Campaigns
Partisan dealignment, societal and technological changes have jointly contributed to shaping the nature of electoral campaigns. As the number of floating voters 7 as well as late-deciders 8 who can be influenced and persuaded in the run up to an election keeps rising, so does the scholarly attention paid to campaign mobilisation.
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In defining the very concept of an electoral campaign, Farrell and and the 'quality' of the candidates' campaign effort.
Finally, the mismatch between findings from the voter and elite side of the electoral equation may be due to the level of election that these studies have focused on.
While the former are based on first-order parliamentary elections, the latter are, to date, limited to second-order European elections. Our study allows for the comparison of findings from the supply and demand sides within the same type of election, which is pivotal to resolving the unsettled incongruence.
Hypotheses
Bowler and Farrell conclude that regardless of the electoral incentives in place, candidates work equally hard to get elected. 20 This casts doubt on whether electoral institutions differ in their capacity to mobilise voters. We treat this claim as a null hypothesis.
Electoral campaigns are the effort put in place by candidates and parties to win votes. From a rational choice theory perspective, it is reasonable to imagine that the rules of the game affect the behaviour of the players: candidate-centred electoral mechanisms should put a stronger onus on individuals to promote their candidacy.
The link between one's campaign activity -effort and focus -and electoral performance is simply more direct under these rules. The necessity to maximise personal reputation and profile, and to establish personal ties with constituents, is more salient and clear-cut in a system that rewards personal/preference votes. the utility of personal campaign effort is lower than in candidate-centred systems.
In addition to the effect associated with electoral rules, district magnitude is likely to affect campaign behaviour, on its own and in tandem with the institutional set up on candidate choice options. Identifying the target voters to contact and making one's presence visible is simpler in small districts. 21 Therefore, lower district magnitude should encourage candidates to seek out direct contact with voters, while larger district magnitude should push them to rely more on their party image and exert less personal effort. However, the effects of the district size on the campaign effort are likely to be conditioned by whether voters cast their ballot for candidates or parties.
If candidates compete for personal votes -that is, ballots are cast for candidates -, they simply cannot afford to rely merely on their party image, even when standing in a large constituency where establishing direct contact with voters is difficult. In these contexts, candidates face competition from co-partisans and are under more pressure to distinguish themselves from others. Therefore, the effect of district magnitude on campaign effort should be moderated by whether voters cast their ballot for parties or candidates. Based on these considerations, we formalise the following hypothesis:
H1: Electoral institutions significantly affect campaign effort in the following ways: (a) candidate-centred electoral systems promote greater campaign effort than party-centred systems; (b) district magnitude has a negative effect on campaign effort; and (c) this is weaker in systems where voters cast their ballot for candidates as opposed to parties.
Another element of campaigning that is reasonably related to the structure of the electoral institutions is the focus of the candidates' message. All candidates seek to get out the vote and win voters' choice in the polling booth, but they can choose to do so by putting more (or less) emphasis on themselves (versus their party). Again, the rules of the game should impact the players' behaviour. 
Data and Measures
We evaluate our theoretical expectations on a unique collection of information on candidates running at first-order parliamentary elections. 26 The CCS project, bringing together a wide range of national candidate studies and using a common core questionnaire to allow for cross-country comparisons, is the main source of this 24 Colomer 2011. With regard to campaigning, our dependent variable is labelled as campaign focus. It is based on a survey question directly addressing the primary aim of one's campaign.
This measure ranges from 0 'to attract as much attention as possible to my party' to 10 'to attract as much attention as possible to me as a candidate', offering a unique comparative insight into the kind of messages that candidates convey to the electorate through their campaign effort.
In with the former also conduct more personalised campaigns (5.6 versus 1.7). 32 That said, these differences may, of course, be due to some contextual elements and need to be assessed in a rigorous way, by including possible alternative explanations. 
Key Explanatory Variables and Controls
We rely on survey data from a diverse set of countries, covering a variety of electoral institutions and district magnitudes. 33 ii) Vote choice: the extent to which voters are able to vote for a specific candidate, ranging from 1 to 4.
iii) District: the effect of a district type on the importance of personal reputation, ranging from 1 to 2.
candidates. In-between we have PR systems where voters cast their ballot for the party with an option to alter candidate rankings (Iceland), where they cast preference votes with an option to vote for the party ticket (Australian Senate), and where they can cast either a candidate or a party vote (Denmark). 34 The following analysis includes both the House of Representatives (plurality system) and Senate (PR system) candidates from Australia as the 2007 and 2013 survey data include an identifier for the legislative chamber. In case of Germany, however, there was no identifier for the type of candidacy available. Therefore, we included only those Bundestag candidates in the analysis who had a specific Wahlkreis identifier in the 2009 survey data as SMD candidates, since we know that they did stand for election in a plurality constituency.
Higher scores across these components are indicative of a candidate-centred electoral system. Therefore, the overall index ranges from 3 to 9, with higher values corresponding to greater incentives for candidates to cultivate a personal vote.
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As the final, yet potentially important, element of the electoral set up, we explore the role of the district magnitude in influencing the candidates' campaign behaviour.
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We do so by looking at whether the district magnitude has a direct, independent effect on campaign behaviour, but also whether its effect is being conditioned by vote choice. Table A1 for a detailed breakdown of how the different countries and their electoral systems are coded. 37 We also ran models where district magnitude was not used alongside smd and electoral incentives.
Estimates from these models are in line with the findings reported here and available upon request. 38 We acknowledge that population density would be a more fine-grained measure to address the impact of the district size on the candidates' campaign strategy. Geographical data to systematically match constituencies in our data with information on population density is, however, not available.
That said, district magnitude does represent a good alternative for capturing the district size effect. As noted by Taagepera and Shugart (1989) , district magnitude is calibrated on district size where size "refers to the number of voters in an electoral district or the geographical extent of a district".
of a natural logarithm is the conventional practice, 39 and particularly useful to correct the skewed nature of the district magnitude in our data.
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Finally, we control for several elements that previous studies have shown to be relevant to explaining campaign effort and focus. 41 First and foremost, we account for campaign marginality -that is, the chance of being elected. Clearly, the higher the foreseen chance of success, the stronger the incentive for electioneering.
Moreover, candidates who believe that they are unlikely to get elected are likely to put less effort into their own campaign and opt for a more party-focused campaign strategy to build a profile within their party, with consequent implications for campaigning. We operationalise the likelihood of success as the candidates' selfperceived likelihood of success before their campaign started, ranging from 1 'I could not win' to 5 'I could not lose'. Second, the nature of the candidate's campaign may be influenced by her relationship with her party. Namely, the further away a candidate's own positions are from those of her party, the more likely she is to conduct a campaign with a personalised focus and to put in extra campaign effort to get her own political views across. We measure ideological distance as the absolute difference between the left-right position of the candidate and that of her party (as perceived by the candidate). It ranges from 0 'no difference' to 10 'maximum difference'. Left-right placement is not only the most comparable measure for a study of this sort, but also the best available shortcut for aggregating multiple policy 39 Benoit 2002. 40 Our sample includes data from the Netherlands where all 150 House of Representatives seats are allocated in a single nation-wide constituency.
41 Bowler and Farrell 2011; Gibson and McAllister 2006; Zittel and Gschwend 2008; Zittel 2009. positions. 42 Third, we look at the candidates' political experience by accounting for incumbency (past MP) and their position within the party (party hierarchy). Past MP is coded 1 if the candidate has been a member of parliament before and 0 if not, and party hierarchy is coded 1 if she has held national party office or been employed by it and 0 if not. We expect candidates with such experience to undertake more intensive and personalised campaigns. Fourth, we control for the candidates' proximity to voters by separating those living in the constituency where they stand for election (coded 1) from the rest (coded 0) on the premise that the former are more invested in constituency matters and, therefore, push harder to get elected through a stronger campaign effort and more personalised campaign focus. index of campaign effort is analysed using ordered probit, given the structure of the variable. In line with the key explanatory elements described above, we run three sets of models for each dependent variable: the first set (Models 1, 4, and 7) accounts for electoral mechanisms by using the simple plurality dummy, the second set (Models 2, 5, and 8) uses the electoral incentives index, and the final third set (Models 3, 6, and 9) explores the interactive effects of district magnitude and vote choice. Finally, model specifications take into account the country-specific contexts of electoral politics; therefore, we include country dummies as a control. 44 This accounts for any country-specific effects beyond the electoral institutions.
Empirical Analysis
We begin by addressing the effects of electoral institutions on electioneering. The first set of models (1-3), reported in Table 2 , explain variation in campaign effort (time). In line with our theoretical expectations, candidate-centred electoral systems seem to provide an incentive for candidates to campaign harder. The coefficient of SMD in Model 1 shows a difference of 11 hours per week between plurality and PR systems as the former produce higher intensity campaign effort. When we look at more nuances of the electoral mechanisms in Model 2, we observe an average increase of 3 hours per week in campaign effort as we move from those who have weaker systemic incentives to cultivate a personal vote to those who have stronger incentives to do so. Consistently across the different models, a significant effect of electoral institutions exists on the intensity of candidates' campaign effort. 44 We prefer this approach to multi-level modelling as the structure of the data does not satisfy the 30/30 rule (see Kreft 1996 ). Estimates from multi-level models that have countries as a Level-2 variable are, however, similar to the findings reported here and presented in the online appendix Table   A3 . We also ran multi-level models with parties as a Level-2 variable; their estimates are in line with the findings reported here and presented in the online appendix Table A4 . Table 2 also shows that district magnitude has a negative effect on the dependent variable. A shift from the smallest to the largest constituency corresponds to a 6 hours per week decline in candidates' predicted campaign effort (based on estimates in Models 1 and 2). As indicated by Model 3, the negative effect of district magnitude is, however, influenced by vote choice. It is strongest in electoral systems where voters are required to cast their ballot for a party list. Clearly, the extent to which electoral mobilisation is promoted through candidates' campaign effort is substantially different across the various electoral systems. The more candidatecentred the electoral set up, and the smaller the district magnitude, the higher the intensity of candidates' campaign effort, ceteris paribus.
As expected, however, campaign effort is not just a function of the electoral set up.
At the individual level, we find that candidates who are confident in their electoral chances ahead of their campaign conduct significantly higher intensity campaigns than candidates who did not expect to get elected. Predicted campaign effort rises from 18 hours per week for candidates who thought that they had no chance of getting elected to 34 hours per week for candidates who felt certain to get elected prior to campaigning. In addition, small positive effects -that is, around 3 hours per week -are associated with both political experience variables. At the same time, we do not find ideological distance or proximity to voters to play a significant role in affecting how much time candidates choose to spend on their campaign.
With regard to the qualitative measure of candidates' campaign effort, we find that the same patterns are visible when explaining the complexity of the candidates' campaign effort (Table 3 ). In line with our theoretical expectations, candidates in SMD systems tend to use a wider range of campaign activities than their counterparts in PR systems, while the positive effect associated with electoral incentives indicates that candidates undertake more complex campaigns when the electoral set up offers stronger incentives to cultivate a personal vote. In addition, larger district magnitude coincides with the use of a narrower range of campaign activities and the largest negative effect is again observed in electoral systems where voters have to cast their ballot for a party list. These findings are in line with what we observed when looking at the 'quantitative' aspect of campaign effort, reaffirming that higher levels of campaign effort are associated with more candidatecentred electoral set ups and smaller district magnitudes. Figure 1a highlights well how the probability of high campaign complexity -that is, maximum score for campaign complexity -increases as we move from a partycentred electoral system to a candidate-centred one, while the opposite is true for candidates' likelihood of conducting low complexity campaigns. In a similar vein, Figure 1b shows that the effects of district magnitude go in the opposite direction.
While lower district magnitude leads to a higher likelihood of implementing a broad array of campaign tools, larger districts depress the use of multiple campaign tools.
These effects are, however, of notably smaller scale. A shift from the smallest to largest district brings about an 8% increase in candidates' likelihood of conducting a low complexity campaign (from 8% to 16%) and a 9% decline in their likelihood of conducting a high complexity campaign (from 24% to 15%). In sum, candidatecentred electoral set ups and smaller district magnitudes tend to propel higher mobilisation efforts, in terms of campaign intensity as well as complexity. Having seen how electoral institutions affect both the 'quantity' and 'quality' of campaign effort, we move to assessing whether the electoral set up also has an effect on the extent to which the candidates' campaign messages focus on themselves versus their party. Table 4 presents the outputs from the analyses of campaign focus.
The findings are clear and consistent: candidate-centred electoral set ups incentivise candidates to opt for a more candidate-focused campaign strategy. The coefficient of SMD in Model 7 shows a 2.2-point difference between SMD and PR systems, with the former producing more personalised electoral campaigns. When looking at electoral systems in a more nuanced manner in Model 8, we observe an average 0.6-point increase in the extent to which candidates prioritise their own (versus party) image when we move from those who have weaker systemic incentives to cultivate a personal vote to those who have stronger incentives to do so. While quite modest in size, the effect is robust across the different specifications of the key independent variable. On the contrary, the evidence that the district magnitude has an effect on campaign focus is limited. We do not observe a significant independent effect for district magnitude in Models 7 and 8, with a significant negative effect being present only when focusing on two categories of vote choice in Model 9. Once again, the evidence of a potential interaction effect between electoral incentives and district magnitude, albeit in line with the expectations, is empirically weak. At the individual level, we find that candidates who are more confident in their electoral chances conduct more candidate-focused campaigns, as do those who feel ideologically more distant from their party. At the same time, there is no evidence that the candidates' previous political experience or proximity to voters plays a role in influencing their campaign focus.
In summary, the empirical analysis indicates clearly that electoral institutions are significant predictors for electioneering practices after all, leading to the rejection of the claim that candidates work equally hard irrespective of the electoral system type.
However, when it comes to assessing the effects of electoral institutions on campaigning, the evidence is more multifaceted. More candidate-centred electoral systems do lead to more personalised campaign messages as expected, but district magnitude does not have an independent effect on the campaign focus. A significant negative effect for the district magnitude is only found where voters either have to or tend to cast their ballot for a party. No matter how large (or small) the district, candidates concentrate on promoting their own personal image if the electoral set up encourages or requires voters to cast personal/preference votes.
The disjuncture between previous findings from the elite side and the voter side literature is resolved when looking at the first-order parliamentary elections, and when the complexity of electioneering and campaigning are taken into account.
Conclusions
In this article we have explored the effects of electoral institutions on the campaign behaviour of candidates running for office at first-order parliamentary elections.
While studies of the European elections have provided us with valuable insights into the impact of electoral institutions on individual-level campaigning during secondorder elections, we have taken a first step to extend this type of analysis to the arena that still remains most crucial for political competition among candidates and parties, as well as for the voters. Our study contributes to the wider debate on the role of electoral institutions in promoting political engagement and voter mobilisation by showing that smaller districts in candidate-centred electoral systems maximise the likelihood of voters experiencing higher intensity campaigns.
Campaigns provide voters with the knowledge they need to make an informed vote choice and increase the likelihood of electoral participation. 47 The We find that electoral institutions do shape the candidates' campaign behaviour in the run up to first-order parliamentary elections, both in terms of campaign effort and campaign focus. The extent to which voters are likely to experience campaign stimuli is closely related to electoral institutions as candidates' campaign effort tends to be more intense, as well as complex, under candidate-centred electoral institutions than under party-centred ones. Equally, candidates seem to tailor their campaign message to the electoral context, as the extent to which it tends to be candidatefocused is greater under candidate-centred electoral set ups. While the debate on the personalisation of electoral campaigns has, to date, focused mostly on the role of party leaders, this indicates that it should also feature the candidate side more prominently. All in all, the findings suggest that the impact of electoral institutions on campaigns is more far-reaching than what the state of the art describes. Both the amount and type of campaign stimuli that voters tend to experience is closely related to electoral institutions.
In sum, our findings broaden the understanding of how electoral institutions affect campaign practices in the run up to first-order parliamentary elections. It is generally accepted that electoral campaigns are shaped by country-specific dynamics as well as party-and candidate-specific characteristics. The empirical evidence offered here adds electoral institutions to this list.
